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1Guest editor’s presentation&
(Presentación del editor)
David Rey*
Universidad El Bosque
& Editing this special issue has been a rewarding experience. Every person involved was enthusiastic 
about the project. I wish to thank the authors of the papers for their excellent contributions and the 
anonymous reviewers for their efficiency and generosity. I also wish to thank Agustín Vicente, María 
José García Encinas, and Antonio Diéguez for their support, and my friend Alfonso Conde for his par-
ticipation in the project during its early stages. María José contributed to the preparation of the issue 
during the whole editorial process, and for that I am especially grateful to her. My work on this issue 
was supported by the MEIC (Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad), Spanish Govern-
ment, Excelencia programme project no. FFI2016-80636-P.
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I am glad to present to the readers of Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, His-
tory, and the Foundations of Science this special issue devoted to the intellectual legacy of the 
American philosopher Jerry Alan Fodor (1935-2017).
Jerry Fodor was born and raised in New York City. In 1956, he earned his bachelor’s 
degree at Columbia University and four years later he received his Ph.D. in Philosophy 
from Princeton University. He held teaching positions at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, the City University of New York, and Rutgers University. Over the course of 
fifty-five years, he authored (or co-authored) thirteen books1 and more than one hundred 
articles. Fodor’s published work had a significant impact on cognitive psychology and the 
philosophy of mind. In his most influential writings, he defended substantive views about 
the nature and structure of the mind—views like the computational theory of mental pro-
cesses and the modular theory of cognitive architecture—and criticized various theories 
and doctrines such as behaviorism, connectionism, inferencial role semantics, semantic ho-
lism, and Darwinism.2
The present issue of Theoria puts together five papers written by seven distinguished 
scholars. These papers discuss some of Fodor’s major contributions to the philosophy of 
mind, including his language of thought hypothesis, his theoretical arguments for that hy-
pothesis, his approach to concept acquisition, and his defense of the autonomy of psychol-
ogy. There are, of course, other Fodorian topics that are not examined in this special issue. 
It is my hope that the issue will give its readers a motivation to keep thinking about the 
ideas that Fodor insightfully explored in his books and papers.
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